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1 Abstraction and iteration
The purpose of this article is to assess the prospects for a Scottish neo-logicist
foundation for a set theory. The gold standard would be a theory as rich and useful
as the dominant one, ZFC, Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with choice, perhaps aug-
mented with large cardinal principles. Although the present paper is self-contained,
we draw upon recent work in [32] in which we explore the power of a reasonably
pure principle of reflection.
To establish terminology, the Scottish neo-logicist program is to develop branches
of mathematics using abstraction principles in the form:
§α = §β↔ α ∼ β
where the variables α and β range over items of a certain sort, § is an operator
taking items of this sort to objects, and ∼ is an equivalence relation on this sort of
item.
The standard exemplar, of course, is Hume’s principle:
#F = #G ≡ F ≈ G
where, as usual, F ≈ G is an abbreviation of the second-order statement that there
is a one-one correspondence from F onto G. Hume’s principle, is the main support
for what is regarded as a success-story for the Scottish neo-logicist program, at
least by its advocates. The search is on to develop more powerful mathematical
theories on a similar basis.
As witnessed by this volume and a significant portion of the contemporary liter-
ature in the philosophy of mathematics, Scottish neo-logicism remains controver-
sial, even for arithmetic. There are, for example, issues of Caesar and Bad Com-
pany to deal with. Here, we will only touch briefly on these problems, and only
to the extent to which they bear on the prospects for a candidate neo-logicist set
theory. We take the success of the program for arithmetic for granted, at least for
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the sake of argument. We will also concede that there is, or can be, an adequate neo-
logicist theory of real analysis—perhaps along the lines of [11] or [29]—complex
analysis, functional analysis, and the like. Our focus is on the prospects for a neo-
logicist set theory.
The standard motivation for the axioms of set theory stems from the technical ob-
servation that Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, with or without choice, ZF(C), proves
that every set is a member of some Vα, where, as usual:
V0 = ∅; Vα+1 = P(Vα); and Vλ =
⋃
α<λ
Vα for limit ordinals λ,
where ∅ is the empty set and for each set x, P(x) is the power set of x. This de-
scription of the cumulative hierarchy of well-founded sets dates back (at least) to
[22], [35], and [39].1 But while the early fathers of set theory sometimes conceived
of this cumulative hierarchy as an inner model of the axioms, the iterative picture
of the universe of set theory as layered in levels or stages eventually emerged with
Kurt Go¨del as a powerful heuristic for motivating the axioms of set theory gener-
ally. This is what has come to be known as the iterative conception of set.
When put this way, the cumulative hierarchy seems to presuppose the ordinals.
However, ordinals are generally taken to be von Neumann ordinals which, of
course, are certain sets—transitive pure sets well-ordered by membership. The
picture that emerges is that there is a stage corresponding to every von Neumann
ordinal, and there is a von Neumann ordinal corresponding to each stage.2
Many of the axioms of ZFC can be viewed as assumptions concerning the extent of
the cumulative hierarchy. They set lower bounds on the extent of the ordinal spine,
which, in turn, determines the extent of the hierarchy. For example, the axiom
of infinity amounts to the existence of a first transfinite stage, Vω. The power set
axiom allows us to move from a given stage, Vα, to its successor stage, Vα+1, and
therefore tells us that the universe itself resembles a “limit stage”, which cannot be
reached from below by the power-set operation. Even replacement can be regarded
as a cofinality principle on the extent of the cumulative hierarchy, one designed to
make sure that any set-sized collection of stages is bounded by some later stage of
the cumulative hierarchy.3
One of the purposes of set theory is foundational: to provide surrogates for all
mathematical objects, and thus an arena in which relations between mathematical
theories can be investigated, questions of existence and coherence can be adjudi-
1See, for example, [17].
2Not every exposition of the cumulative hierarchy or the iterative conception presupposes the
ordinals. [27] provided an axiomatization of set theory directly motivated by the picture of the
universe of set theory as layered in levels—or “partial universes” as he called them—without explicit
recourse to ordinals. Boolos’ exposition of the iterative conception in [2] draws on this work as do,
for example, more recent axiomatizations of iterative set theory in [24].
3See [3] and [2] for discussion.
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cated, etc. For better or worse, ZFC takes us well beyond what is needed to re-
capture most of ordinary mathematics, except of course foundational theories like
category theory and set theory itself. Even without invoking sophisticated coding
techniques, it is hard to imagine a need to go beyond, say, stage Vω+10. So even
the weaker Zermelo set theory, which, on its common interpretation, takes the iter-
ation up to (but not including) stage Vω+ω, is more than sufficient for foundational
purposes, at least for non-foundational mathematical theories. Thus, it would be
quite a coup if even a theory as powerful as Zermelo set theory could be devel-
oped along neo-logicist lines. Then the neo-logicist could proudly recapitulate,
or develop surrogates for, pretty much every standard mathematical theory, except
perhaps for foundational ones. Given the epistemological goals of the neo-logicist
program, there would still be questions concerning the relationship between the
set-theoretic surrogates and the theories they are surrogates for. Can we account
for a priori knowledge of the basic principles of mathematical theory X by showing
to derive a standard model for X in a neo-logicist set theory? We hereby set all such
Caesar-type questions aside.
While we are aiming high, notice that even full ZFC fails to completely satisfy
common assumptions underlying the extent of the cumulative hierarchy. Most
practicing set theorists do not take the axioms, in toto, to set an upper-bound on
iteration. A cardinal κ is strongly inaccessible if it is regular and larger than the
powerset of any smaller cardinal. The axioms of ZFC do not entail the existence
of any strongly inaccessible cardinals. Indeed, if κ is a strong inaccessible, then
the result of iterating the hierarchy to stage κ will result in a model of ZFC (and
this model satisfies the statement that there are no strongly inaccessible cardinals).
Nevertheless, the existence of (lots of) strong inaccessibles is a staple of set theory.4
Indeed, strong inaccessibles are the very bottom of a scale of “small” large cardi-
nals.
2 Ineffability and reflection
One common way to capture the assumption that there is no upper-bound on the it-
eration involved in the cumulative hierarchy—beyond platitudes such as that the it-
eration proceeds “all the way” or “as far as possible” or “through all the ordinals”—
is the admittedly vague thought that the universe of set theory is, in a sense to be
elucidated, ineffable or indescribable. And here we broach a central topic of this
paper, the extent to which this ineffability is compatible with Scottish neo-logicism.
The thought that the universe of set theory is ineffable has been exploited to mo-
tivate lower-bounds on the extent of the cumulative hierarchy, through what are
4An exception is Abraham Fraenkel’s short lived axiom of restriction which asserts, in effect, that
there are no sets other than those whose existence follows from directly from the other axioms. This
is an analogue of the principle of induction in arithmetic. See Fraenkel [1922] and [9], 113-116.
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called “reflection principles”. These principles tell us that no formula of a given
language is able to uniquely characterize the universe of all sets. That is, if it is
satisfied by the universe of all sets, then it is satisfied when suitably relativized to
the members of some set. The strength of such principles is generally tied to the
expressive resources of the language in question.
One heuristic motivation for these principles proceeds via a “limitation of size”
theme, which is sometimes combined with the iterative conception in order to mo-
tivate the axioms of ZFC. Roughly, limitation of size is the thought that some
objects form a set just in case they are not too many of them. But then one should
say how many are too many. The admittedly vague Cantorian idea is that some sets
are too many only if they are indeterminately or indefinitely many. The connection
between this thought and reflection is made explicit by [4] and [5] (see ch. 3), with
the following train:
(1) . . . the sets are indeterminately or indefinitely many.
(2) . . . the sets are indefinably or indescribably many.
(3) . . . any statement Φ that holds of them fails to describe how many they are.
(4) . . . any statement Φ that holds of them continues to hold if reinterpreted to be
not about all of them but just about some of them, fewer than all of them.
(5) . . . any statement Φ that holds of them continues to hold if reinterpreted to be
not about all of them but just some of them, few enough to form a set.
As Burgess notes, these steps are not meant to provide a deductive argument sup-
porting reflection. All the same, reflection seems to be in line with the practice of
set theorists.
In informal language, [4] indicates how to derive principles of set existence from
(4):
. . . though it is possible to make a true statement about how many
objects there are, there are too many objects for it to be possible for
such a statement to be definitive of how many there are: there will
necessarily be not merely as many as is said, but more also . . . To
begin with, there is at least one object. By [(4)], that would still be true
if one were speaking not of all objects, but just some of the objects,
fewer than all; in other words, it is an understatement, which means
that there must be at least two objects. Then, by [(4)] again, that is an
understatement, so there are at least three objects. Continuing in this
way, there are infinitely many objects. But by [(4)], even that is an
understatement, so there must be uncountably many objects. But by
[(4)] again, even that is an understatement, so . . . (p. 192)
It turns out, however, that it is step (5) that provides the most power when we let
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Φ range over formulas of the language of higher-order set theory.5 For example, in
the language of second-order ZFC, we can express the statement Φ that the universe
of set theory, V , forms a strongly inaccessible class, and, since it is presumed that
the universe is ineffable, Φ cannot characterize the universe uniquely. Therefore,
there is a set in the cumulative hierarchy that satisfies Φ. Thus, reflection entails
the existence of an inaccessible cardinal.
In an early articulation of the iterative conception, [39] proposed the existence of
“an unbounded sequence of [inaccessible cardinals] as a new axiom of meta-set
theory.” According to this principle, for each ordinal α, there is a unique inacces-
sible cardinal κα. But this is not the end of the process of reflection. Reflection on
the new axiom would entail that there is a set x such that for every ordinal α ∈ x,
κα ∈ x. This, in turn, entails the existence of a fixed point in the κ-series: an ordinal
κ such that κ = κκ. This is called a “hyper-inaccessible”. Successive applications
of second-order reflection soon yield Mahlo cardinals of all orders, weakly com-
pact cardinals and, more generally, Π1n-indescribable cardinals for each n ∈ ω.6
However, second-order reflection is still relatively weak by the lights of large car-
dinal axioms and lies at the bottom of an entire hierarchy of stronger and stronger
indescribable cardinals which are known to be compatible with V = L.7
Now, Zermelo wrote:
If we now put forward the general hypothesis that every categorically
determined domain can also be interpreted as a set in some way, i.e.,
can appear as an element of a normal domain [a set-theoretic model
of set theory], it follows that to each normal domain there is a higher
domain with the same basis.8
5When we restrict ourselves to first-order formulas, every instance of (5) is a theorem of first-
order ZFC. In fact, this is the main observation [23] exploited to show that first-order ZFC is not
finitely axiomatizable.
6In general, second-order reflection amounts to Π1n-indescribability for every n ∈ ω. See [31]
and [30], section 6.3. By a result due to Hanf and Scott, weakly compact cardinals are exactly the
Π11-cardinals. For details, see for example [18], Theorem 6.4, or [16], Theorem 17.18.
7That Πmn -indescribability is compatible with V = L is noted, for example, by [18], Ch. 1,
Theorem 6.6. One has to proceed with caution when formulating reflection in terms of third- and
higher-order languages. [25] observes that inconsistency results if we allow third-order parameters
unrestrictedly. However, [33] has motivated a restriction of reflection with third- and higher-order
parameters to a special class of formulas, i.e., positive formulas, and he has proposed a corresponding
hierarchy of reflection principles. These principles take us well beyond Πnm-indescribability—or even
beyond reflection on formulas of transfinite order without third- or higher-order parameters—as they
lead to ineffable cardinals. Much stronger indescribability principles—some of which reflect formu-
las of transfinite order (with no third- or higher-order parameters)—fall under the consistency result
proved in [19]. Koellner has proved a dichotomy theorem to the effect that generalized reflection
principles, which include Tait’s reflection principles, are either weak (i.e. consistent relative to κ(ω)
and hence with V = L) or inconsistent. In the concluding section 9 of the present paper, we do briefly
countenance ascent to higher-order principles of reflection, but we restrict attention to sentences, with
no parameters of any order.
8See [39], 1232.
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In [36] (see p. 555), Hao Wang captured the idea succinctly:
Any time we try to capture the universe from what we positively pos-
sess (or can express) we fail the task and the characterization is satis-
fied by certain (large) sets.
3 Framework
[32] presents a reasonably pure version of ineffability and reflection, in the context
of a Fregean theory of extensions. Without relying on any substantial set-theoretic
assumptions concerning the structure of the set-theoretic universe, we develop a
remarkably powerful theory, enough to show the consistency of Zermelo set theory
with choice, and thus to recapture pretty much all extant mathematics, except pos-
sibly for foundational theories like category theory or set theory.
Here we briefly recapitulate our theory of extensions and reformulate one of its ax-
ioms in the shape of an abstraction principle. As we take ineffability and reflection
to be an integral part of contemporary set theory, we then use this opportunity to
assess the prospects for a neo-logicist set theory. On this score, our conclusions are
mostly negative.
To the extent to which our abstraction principle will eventually yield much of ordi-
nary mathematics, we think it may be of some interest for the neo-logicists. How-
ever, if they insist on ZFC as their target, then our result will still miss the mark by
a long shot. Indeed, as we will eventually note, it is consistent with ZFC that our
proposed abstraction has models of cardinality smaller than ℵω1 , which is teensy
even by the lights of ZFC itself, let alone any large cardinal principles.
We work in a second-order language, understood with full, standard semantics.
We do not wish to make an issue over what the second-order variables range over:
Fregean concepts, classes, logical sets, whatever. Since we will be concerned with
a modification of Frege’s Basic Law V, we will refer to the items in the range of
the second-order quantifiers as Fregean concepts. But the reader should feel free
to substitute a different locution if she so wishes.
Recall Frege’s inconsistent Basic Law V:
(F) = (G) ≡ ∀x(Fx ≡ Gx)
Our plan is to begin with a version of Basic Law V which restricts the principle to
certain concepts. Introduce a word Good for those concepts, and let Bad stand for
its complement.
There are several ways to restrict Basic Law V, with the choice between them only
a matter of convenience. [32] employ a second-order predicate Ext(x, F), which is
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satisfied by an object x and a concept F just in case x is an (or the) extension of F.
Our axiom in [32] is thus:
Ext(x, X) & Ext(y,Y)→ (x = y ≡ ∀z(Xz ≡ Yz))
And we define Good and Bad by means of the following:
Good(F) ≡d f ∃x Ext(x, F)
Bad(F) ≡d f ¬Good(F).
This, too, is the option [5] prefers.
A second option is to think of the extension operator  as a partial function from
Good concepts to objects, in which case (F) becomes a non-denoting singular
term when F is Bad. We would then require a free logic to handle such terms. This
is the option followed in [14] and [1]. Yet a third option is to think of the extension
operator as a total function (i.e., defined on all concepts) but to indicate that we do
not care what the “extension” of Bad concepts may be.9 Here we adopt yet a fourth
option, followed by [2] and [28]. We take the extension operator to be total and
assign a dummy object as the “extension” of all Bad concepts. Thus our principle
is this:
(F) = (G) ≡ ((Bad(F) & Bad(G)) ∨ ∀x(Fx ≡ Gx)). (RV)
We now define a set and membership predicate in the obvious way.10
ext(x) ≡d f ∃X (Good(X) & x = (X)
x ∈ y ≡d f ∃X (Good(X) & y = (X) & Xx).
Notice that (RV) has the form of an abstraction principle. [28] argues that any
neo-logicist set theory would have to be based on a principle in a similar form.
This is seconded by [10]. Moreover, (RV) will hold in just about any set theory
imaginable. If we define a concept F to be Good just in case there is a set whose
members are all and only the instances of F, then (RV) is just the principle of
extensionality.
On its own, however, (RV) is only a principle of extensionality. It does not follow
from (RV) that there are any Good concepts, and thus any extensions at all. A set
9In this case, the relevant principle would be:
Good(F) & Good(G)→ ((F) = (G) ≡ ∀x(Fx ≡ Gx)).
10These definitions are slightly different from those in [2] and [28], where the restriction to Good
concepts is not invoked. Since the dummy “extension” of Bad concepts is in the range of the  -
operator, those papers take it to be an “extension.” Here we define the “ext” predicate to exclude the
dummy “extension”, and we follow this in our informal gloss as well, concerning the English word
“extension”. In what follows, a phrase like “X has an extension” is to be synonymous with “X is
Good”.
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theory will emerge only when we add some principles concerning which concepts
are Good. One option, we suppose, would be to take Good as a primitive and add
the axioms of ZFC, phrased in those terms. The empty set axiom would be the
statement that the empty concept is Good:
∀X(∀x ¬Xx→ Good(X));
the pair-set axiom would be:
∀x∀y(∀X(∀z(Xz→ (z = x ∨ z = y)))→ Good(X));
and so forth. To belabor the obvious, the power, and the interest, of that theory
would come from the added axioms, and have nothing to do with the neo-logicist
program. Indeed, the theory is just a notational variant of ZFC, with the principle
of extensionality formulated as an abstraction.
The best option for the neo-logicist would be to provide an explicit definition of
Good (or Bad), presumably using only logical resources, or perhaps logical re-
sources augmented with other abstraction operators. This, we take it, is the crux of
the problem. Although we do provide some explicit definitions below, our first plan
is to use the notion of ineffability to motivate a reflection principle, which provides
a sufficient condition for a concept to be Good. This yields existence principles and
a decent set theory (albeit still one weaker than ZFC). To foreshadow our conclu-
sion, an explicit definition of Good (or Bad) would undermine the ineffability. It
would be to characterize what the underlying motivation takes to be uncharacteri-
zable or, to use a phrase coined in [32], to eff the ineffable. For now, then we take
Good(X) to be a primitive of our system, and define Bad(X) as ¬Good(X).
4 It’s Good is to be smaller than some concept describable
in pure second-order logic
We define the relativization of a sentence Φ to a concept F to be the result of
relativizing the quantifiers in Φ to F, by which we mean, as usual, the result of
replacing:
∃x(...) with ∃x(Fx &...)
∃X(...) with ∃X(∀x(Xx→ Fx) &...)
∀x(...) with ∀x(Fx→ ...)
∀X(...) with ∀X(∀x(Xx→ Fx)→ ...).
We write ΦF for the relativization of Φ to F. If the language in question has a
relation for membership, and if t is a term, then Φt is the relativization of Φ to the
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concept of being a member of t. That is, Φt is the result of replacing:
∃x(...) with ∃x(x ∈ t &...)
∃X(...) with ∃X(∀x(Xx→ x ∈ t) &...)
∀x(...) with ∀x(x ∈ t → ...)
∀X(...) with ∀X(∀x(Xx→ x ∈ t)→ ...).
If F and G are concepts, then let “F ≈ G” be the usual second-order statement
that F is equinumerous with G. That is, F ≈ G if and only if there is a one-to-
one relation from F onto G.11 Similarly, let F  G say that there is a one-to-one
relation from F to G, and let “F ≺ G” say that F  G but not G  F.
If a sentence Φ with no non-logical terminology is true in a structure M, then Φ
is true in any structure whose universe is equinumerous with that ofM. In effect,
the only distinctions among models that can be made with such “pure” sentences
are differences of cardinality. Since we are concerned with relative sizes of vari-
ous concepts and extensions, it makes sense to invoke purely logical sentences in
reflection here.
Let Φ be a sentence in a formal language. The size a concept F must have, in order
for ΦF to hold, is a lower bound that Φ imposes on the universe. For example,
the sentence ∃x∃y(x , y) imposes a lower bound of 2 on the size of the universe,
since (∃x∃y(x , y))F holds only if F applies to at least two objects. And if PA2
is the conjunction of the axioms of second-order Peano arithmetic, then PA2 sets a
lower bound of ℵ0 on the universe. Similarly, Z2, the conjunction of the axioms of
second-order ZFC, sets a lower bound at the first strong inaccessible.
More formally, say that a concept F is fixed by a sentence Φ just in case ΦF and
for every concept X, if ΦX then F  X. This is at least one formal analogue of
the notion of Φ setting a bound (on the universe) at the “size” of F. Say that
F is bounded if there is a sentence Φ of pure second-order logic (i.e., Φ has no
non-logical terminology) and a concept G such that F  G and G is fixed by Φ.12
The thesis here is that every bounded concept is Good. So for each sentence Φ of
pure second-order logic, the following should hold:
∃G(F  G & ΦG & ∀H(ΦH → G  H))→ Good(F). (RF)
The schema seems to correspond to Burgess’ (4) above. Our theory is hereby
dubbed FZBB2, for Frege-Zermelo-Bernays-Burgess.13 It is axiomatized by the
11The formal definition of equinumerosity is well-defined on any pair of concepts, whether or not
they have extensions.
12This notion of boundedness is a counterpart, in pure logic, of the model-theoretic notion of an
ordinal being “pinned down” by a sentence.
13The “2” is to contrast the present system from FZBB, developed in [32]. That theory is axiom-
atized by a counterpart to (RF) and the analogue of the extensionality principle given above. FZBB
can be interpreted in FZBB2 by defining Ext(x, X) as (Good(X) & x = (X)). One can also interpret
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schema (RF) and the aforementioned principle of extensionality:
(F) = (G) ≡ ((Bad(F) & Bad(G)) ∨ ∀x(Fx ≡ Gx) (RV)
Although the intuitive thought is that all Bad concepts are concepts larger than any
concept fixed by a sentence of pure second-order logic, we will eventually attend
to higher-order generalizations of this. But notice how the restriction to closed sen-
tences of the language enables us to stay clear from the specter of Reinhardt’s ob-
servation, mentioned in footnote 7, that higher-order reflection principles in which
third-and higher-order parameters are allowed unrestrictedly lead to inconsistency.
5 What we can offer
Further details for the following results are in [32] (see note 12). FZBB2 entails
the following:
Empty extension: ∃x(ext(x) & ∀y(¬y ∈ x))
Let F be the empty concept [x : x , x]. Then F is fixed by the sentence
∀x(x , x) (which, of course, is vacuously satisfied by every concept).
That is, we have ∀x(x , x)F and ∀G(∀x(x , x)G → F  G). So F is
bounded, and, by (RF), F is Good. So F has an extension, which we
dub ∅.
Note, incidentally, the use of a neo-logicist ploy of beginning with the concept
“non-self-identical”. The bootstrapping continues:
Singletons: ∀x∃y(ext(y) & ∀z(z ∈ y ≡ z = x))
If a is an object, let F be the concept [x : x = a]. The requisite
sentence is ∃x(x = x). We have ∃x(x = x)F and ∀G(∃x(x = x)G →
F  G). So F is bounded and, by (RF), has an extension {a} whose
only member is a.
Pairs: ∀x∀y∃z(ext(z) & ∀w(w ∈ z ≡ (w = x ∨ w = y)))
If a and b are objects, let F be the concept [x : x = a ∨ x = b]. The
requisite sentence is ∃x∃y(x , y), and, as usual, {a, b} is the unordered
pair of a and b.
As usual, we define the ordered pair 〈a, b〉 of objects a and b, to be {{a}, {a, b}}. It
is straightforward that 〈a, b〉 = 〈c, d〉 if and only if a = c and b = d.
Infinity: There is a Dedekind infinite extension.
FZBB2 in FZBB. The easiest way is to add a constant c to the latter, with an axiom ∀X ¬Ext(c, X),
stating that c is not the extension of any concept. It is straightforward that the result is conservative
over FZBB. Then interpret (X) = x as (Ext(x, X) ∨ (x = c & ¬∃x Ext(x, X))).
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The existence of the empty extension and pairs together entail the ex-
istence of ∅, {∅}, {{∅}}, etc. By (RV) these are all different. So the uni-
verse is Dedekind infinite. Let F be the least concept which applies to
the empty set and is closed under the singleton operation. That is:
∀x(Fx ≡ ∀X((X∅ & ∀z(Xz→ X{z}))→ Xx)).
Let Φ be the following sentence, stating that the universe is Dedekind
infinite:
∃ f (∀x∀y( f x = f y→ x = y) & ∃x∀y(x , f y)).
Then we have ΦF & ∀G(ΦG → F  G). So F has an extension whose
members are precisely ∅, {∅}, {{∅}}, etc.
We do not have unrestricted versions of the other axioms of ZFC. In most cases,
the reason is that FZBB2 provides only a sufficient condition for a concept to have
an extension, namely, to be bounded. But we can derive restricted versions of the
ZF axioms, and these do give the theory considerable power.
Bounded replacement: If F is bounded and G  F then G is Good.
Bounded separation: If F is bounded and ∀x(Gx → Fx) then G is
Good.
On the limitation of size view, it would be natural to add a general principle of
replacement: If F is Good and G  F, then G is Good. We do so at the start of next
section.
Define the power-concept of a concept F, written P(F), to be the concept of being
the extension of a subconcept of F. That is, P(F) is [x : ∃X(x = (X) & ∀x(Xx →
Fx)]. It follows from bounded separation that if a concept F is bounded, then every
subconcept of F is bounded and thus, by (RF), has an extension. So by (RV), every
such subconcept has an extension. In the present context, the power set principle
would be that if a concept is Good, then so is its power-concept. That does not
follow from FZBB2, even if we add a general replacement principle. However, we
do have:
Bounded power extension: If F is bounded, then the power-concept
of F is Good.
So we have the existence of the power set of ω, the power set of the power set of ω,
the power set of the power set of that, etc. And that is not the end. So FZBB2 has
the resources to recapture virtually all of classical mathematics, except for foun-
dational theories like ZFC, category theory, and the like. It is thus a reasonably
powerful—if awkward—theory. By bounded replacement, we also have the exis-
tence of an extension that contains Vω and is closed under power extensions. We
will later make use of this fact in order to show that FZBB2 has the resources to
prove the existence of a model for Zermelo set theory.
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Define the union-concept of a concept F, written
⋃
F, to be the concept of being a
member of an extension of which F holds:
⋃
F is [x : ∃y∃X(y = (X) & Fy & x ∈
y))]. Recall that x ∈ y only if y is an extension. So the union-concept of F is just
[x : ∃y(Fy & x ∈ y)]. An unrestricted principle of unions would be that if F has an
extension, then so does the union-concept of F. As we will see in the next section,
this does not hold in full generality here, alas. The best we can do is the following:
Doubly bounded union: Suppose that F is bounded. Suppose further
that there is a bounded concept H such that for every a such that Fa,
the concept [x : x ∈ a] is smaller than or equinumerous with H. Then
the union-concept of F is Good.
Concerning the axiom of choice, the best option seems to be to add a version of the
axiom to the underlying higher-order logic, as a sort of general logical principle.
One plausible candidate is in [13]:
∀R(∀x∃yRxy→ ∃ f Rx f x). (AC)
The logical relationship between this and the more usual axiom of choice in set
theory further highlights the fact that we do not have a non-trivial, necessary condi-
tion for a concept to be Good. In effect, (AC) is a global choice principle. Suppose,
for example, that F is a concept such that for every x, if Fx then x is a non-empty
extension and if Fx, Fy and x , y, then x and y are disjoint. Then (AC) entails that
there is a “choice concept”, a concept G such that for each x such that Fx, there is
exactly one y such that y ∈ x and Gy. We would like a local choice principle which
says that if, in addition to the above, F is Good then it has a Good choice concept.
But, surprisingly, we do not have that. What we get from FZBB2 and (AC) is:
Bounded choice: Suppose F is a bounded concept such that for every
x, if Fx then x is a non-empty extension and if Fx, Fy and x , y, then
x and y are disjoint. Then there is a Good concept G such that for each
x such that Fx, there is exactly one y such that y ∈ x and Gy.
As above, (AC) entails the existence of a choice-concept G for F. But G  F and
so G is bounded and thus Good.
For roughly the reasons provided by [14], FZBB2, even with (AC) and replace-
ment, does not entail that the membership relation is well-founded. This contra-
venes the iterative conception of set, sketched above. The usual move, in contexts
like this one, is to restrict attention to extensions generated by a certain process.
One begins with the empty extension, and, at any given stage, one takes extensions
of concepts under which only extensions generated thus far fall. The resulting ex-
tensions are hereditary well-founded extensions. They are hereditary because they
have only extensions in their transitive closure; and they are well-founded because
the membership relation on them is well-founded.
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We define this notion of hereditary well-founded extension, abbreviated hw f , by
invoking a technique from [2], following [20].14 Define a concept F to be closed
if:
∀y((ext(y) & ∀z(z ∈ y→ Fz))→ Fy)
In words, F is closed if, whenever it holds of the members of an extension, then it
holds of that extension:
hw f (x) ≡d f ∀F(closed(F)→ Fx).
In words, an object is hereditarily well-founded if and only if every closed property
holds of it.
It is straightforward to show that the membership relation, restricted to hw f ex-
tensions, is well-founded. In the context of New V, Boolos showed that x is hw f
if and only if x is an extension and every member of x is hw f . The proof carries
over to the general context here (see [28] 76-78). So the empty set is hereditary
well-founded, and if x and y are hw f , then so is their pair, {x, y}. The von Neumann
ordinals are all hw f , and, in particular, ω is hw f . If x is hw f and if the power set of
x exists, then it is hw f , etc. So the power set of ω, the power set of that, the power
set of that, etc., are all hw f . And if x is hw f and the union of x exists, then it, too,
is hw f .
Proposition 1 of [32] is that FZBB and so FZBB2 entails the satisfiability and thus
consistency of Zermelo set theory, with choice. We show first that Vω, the set of all
hereditarily finite sets, exists and is countable. By bounded power set, we then have
P(Vω) exists, which is Vω+1. Similarly, we have the existence of Vω+2, Vω+3, etc.
By bounded replacement, we have the existence of {Vω+n : n ∈ ω}. The existence
of Vω+ω is then a consequence of doubly bounded union. But Vω+ω is of course
a standard model of Zermelo set theory (and FZBB2 can show this.) To show the
consistency of the axiom of choice with Zermelo set theory, one can mimic Go¨del’s
technique of constructibility.
The same techniques can be used to show more.15 The limits of these techniques
are tied to the limits of the ability to define bounds in the pure second-order lan-
guage: if α is a countable ordinal such that FZBB(2) entails that there is a Good,
well-ordered extension of order-type α, then FZBB(2) entails the existence of Vα.
It should be clear, then, that FZBB(2) is a powerful theory of sets. The hw f ex-
tensions make for a substantial universe, one sufficient to recapture almost all of
contemporary mathematics, and then some.
14[2] uses the term “pure” for what we have called “hereditary well-founded”. As [14] note, this
can be misleading. Our theory has models in which there are extensions e such that membership on e
is not well-founded, but the members of e, the members of the members of e, etc., are all extensions.
Indeed, there can be an extension e such that e = {e}.
15Thanks to Philip Welch for pointing this out to us.
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6 What’s not included
Limits on the power of FZBB2 come from a study of its models. While we are
at it, let us add an unrestricted replacement axiom, which is part and parcel of the
limitation of size view which we used to motivate reflection in the first place:
∀X∀Y((Good(X) & Y  X)→ Good(Y)). (REP)
Unrestricted separation follows, and, FZBB2, (REP), and our global choice princi-
ple (AC) entails local choice.
The meta-theory here is ordinary first-order ZFC. The only primitive, non-logical
terms in the object language are the higher-order predicate Good and the extension
operator . To keep the present study in line with the corresponding §7 of [32], we
look at structures of the formM = 〈d, E〉, where d is a non-empty set, E is a set of
ordered pairs 〈b, a〉, where b ∈ d and a ⊆ d.
The thought is that d is the domain of interpretation ofM and 〈b, a〉 ∈ E only if, in
M, a is (in the extension of) Good and (a) = b. We take it as written that there is
one designated object g ∈ d such that there is no Good subset a ⊆ d with 〈g, a〉 ∈ E.
We take it that if a is a Bad concept, then (a) = g.
In the models we construct, the domain d is a transitive set and, for each Good
concept b, the extension of b is b itself. That is, if b is Good, then (b) = b, and
so 〈b, b〉 ∈ E. For this to be possible, of course, all of the Good concepts must
themselves be members of the domain d.
In line with (REP), the Good concepts of each model are the subsets of its domain
that are smaller than a certain, fixed cardinality. To specify one of our models, then,
we give its domain d and a cardinal number λ. So E is {〈x, x〉 : x ∈ d & |x| < λ}.
These correspond to what [14] call (κ-λ)-models of the relevant variant of (RV).
For convenience, introduce a “dummy” symbol Ω for the concept of being a cardi-
nal. If α is a cardinal, then just read α ∈ Ω and α < Ω as short for α = α. Let κ
be any cardinal or Ω. For each sentence Φ of our pure second-order language, let
f (Φ) be the smallest cardinal δ < κ such that Φδ is true, if there is such a cardinal
δ; otherwise, let f (Φ) = 0. Thus
f (Φ) =
δ if Φδ and for every γ < δ, ¬Φγ0 if no such δ exists.
In effect, f (Φ) is the cardinality of the smallest model of Φ that is itself smaller
than κ, if there is such a model. Define the κ-limit, lκ to be the union of the set of
all f (Φ). So if a sentence Φ is satisfiable on a set smaller than κ, then it is satisfiable
on a set smaller than the κ-limit.16 Notice that since there are only countably many
sentences in the language, if the cofinality of κ is uncountable, then lκ < κ.
16The Ω-limit is called the “Lo¨wenheim number” for the pure second-order language (see [30],
147-157, and the references cited there).
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Recall that a cardinal κ is a strong limit if, for any cardinal λ < κ, 2λ < κ. As Philip
Welch pointed out, the following is a considerable strengthening of Proposition 4
is Section 7 of [32]:
Proposition 1. (ZFC). Let κ be a strong limit of uncountable cofinality, and let λ
be any cardinal such that lκ ≤ λ < κ. Then there is a standard transitive model
M = 〈d, E〉 of FZBB2, (AC), foundation, and (REP) according to which a subset
a ⊆ d is Good if and only if |a| < λ.
Proof Sketch. We need a set d such that for any a ⊆ d, if |a| < λ, then a ∈ d. In
other words, d contains all of its subsets that are smaller than λ.
Consider the set HC(λ) = {x : |trcl(x)| < λ}, which is the set of sets of cardinality
hereditarily less than λ. Now: if λ is regular, then |HC(λ)| = |⋃γ<λ 2γ|; if λ is
singular, then |HC(λ)| = 2λ. Either way, since κ is a strong limit, we have that
|HC(λ)| < κ as desired.
The structure M we are looking for is 〈d, E〉, where E is {〈x, x〉 : x ⊆ d & |x| <
λ}. As noted above, the defined membership relation, on the extensions of M,
coincides with the membership relation of the background meta-theory. So, M
satisfies foundation. The satisfaction of (RV), (REP), and (AC) are immediate.
That leaves only:
∃G(F  G & ΦG & ∀H(ΦH → G  H))→ Good(F) (RF)
So let Φ be a sentence in the language of pure second-order logic. Suppose that
there is a set F ⊆ d such thatM satisfies (∃G(F  G & ΦG & ∀H(ΦH → G  H))).
We have to show that F is Good, which amounts to |F| < λ. There is a subset G of
d such that F  G,M satisfies ΦG, andM satisfies ∀H(ΦH → G  H)). Because
the quantifiers in ΦG are all restricted, it is absolute in the structure. Since M is
standard, so is the “” relation. So ΦG is true, and for all subsets H ⊆ d, if ΦH
then G  H. Since |d| < κ, there is a cardinal δ < κ such that Φδ is true. Recall that
f (Φ) is the smallest such cardinal. Let X be any subset of d of cardinality f (Φ).
Then ΦX is true, and soM satisfies ΦX . So G  X (indeed, G ≈ X). Since F  G,
we have that F  X, and so |F|  f (Φ). But f (Φ) < lκ and lκ ≤ λ. So |F| < λ, and
so, inM, F is Good. That is,M satisfies (F) = F. 
Recall that i0 = ℵ0; for each α, iα+1 = P(iα); and if λ is a limit ordinal, then
iλ =
⋃{iα : α < λ}. Any limit in the i-series is a strong limit cardinal, and
the cofinality of iλ is the cofinality of λ. So iω1 is a strong limit of uncountable
cofinality. Thus from proposition 1, there is a standard model of FZBB2, (AC),
foundation and (REP), whose domain is smaller than iω1 . A fortiori, ZFC entails
that our theory is consistent.
The Generalized Continuum Hypothesis (GCH) is that for every α, ℵα = iα. So
ZFC + GCH entails that there is a standard transitive model of FZBB2, (AC),
foundation and (REP), whose domain is smaller than ℵω1 . Thus:
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Corollary 2. (ZFC) FZBB2, (AC), foundation, and (REP) does not deductively
entail that there is a limit cardinal whose cofinality is uncountable.
Thus, by the standard set by ZFC, our theory is paltry.
Two more corollaries of Proposition 1 are that FZBB (together with (AC), foun-
dation, and (REP)) does not entail the unrestricted union and power extensions
principles. For the first, take κ to be any strong limit of uncountable cofinality, or
Ω, and let λ be the κ-limit lκ. Then we obtain a model in which union fails rather
badly. Because this λ has countable cofinality, there is a countable series δ1, δ2, ...
such that each δi is a Good subset of the model, and so is its own extension, and
thus is a member of the model. Moreover, the set D = {δ1, δ2, ...} is also Good
(since it is countable), but the union
⋃
D is Bad since |⋃D| = κ.17
Next, take κ to be any strong limit of uncountable cofinality, or Ω, and let η be any
cardinal such that lκ < η < κ. Let λ be η+, the smallest cardinal greater than η. In
the model that results from Theorem 1, let a be any subset of the domain such that
|a| = η. Then a is Good, and is thus a member of the domain. But the powerset of
a is of cardinality at least η+ = λ, and so it is Bad.18
In general, a model in the form of the conclusion of Proposition 1 satisfies the
axioms of ZFC only if the indicated cardinal λ is itself a strong inaccessible. In
this case, HC(λ) is just Vλ, which of course has cardinality λ. If λ is any strong
inaccessible, Vλ is a model of FZBB2 only if there is another cardinal κ > λ such
that lκ < λ.19
7 Can we describe the indescribable?
As noted, the above development, as it stands, is not particularly helpful to Scottish
neo-logicism. To be sure, one of the axioms of FZBB2 is an abstraction principle,
namely:
(F) = (G) ≡ ((Bad(F) & Bad(G)) ∨ ∀x(Fx ≡ Gx), (RV)
but this is only a principle of extensionality. Recall that Good is just a primitive in
the language (with Bad(F) defined as ¬Good(F)). The power of the theory comes
from the reflection schema:
∃G(F  G & ΦG & ∀H(ΦH → G  H))→ Good(F), (RF)
17See [32], Corollary 5, for details.
18Again, see [32], Corollary 7, for details.
19In [32], we stated that it is straightforward to verify that every standard model of FZBB is a
strong inaccessible that is greater than the Lo¨wenheim number for second-order logic. Unfortunately,
it is not straightforward to verify this, since the conclusion is actually independent of ZFC.
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and this is not even close to an abstraction. In addition, (RF) only gives a suffi-
cient condition for a concept to be Good and thus have an extension. Abstraction
principles are to give necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of the
abstracts in question.
Recall that a concept F is fixed by a sentence Φ just in case ΦF and for every
concept X, if ΦX then F  X. And F is bounded if there is a sentence Φ of pure
second-order logic and a concept G such that F  G and G is fixed by Φ.
The theme of (RF) is that if a concept F is bounded by a sentence of the pure
second-order language, then F is Good, and thus has an extension. A natural move
for a neo-logicist, perhaps, would be to try to turn this into a necessary and suf-
ficient condition, with a principle saying that a concept is Good if and only if it
is bounded by a sentence of the pure second-order language. If this could be ex-
pressed, there would be an explicit definition of Good (and thus Bad), and so (RV)
could be rendered as a full-fledged abstraction principle.
The obvious route to such an explicit definition is blocked. Indeed, suppose that
there were a formula Ψ(X) in the pure second-order language such that for each
concept F, Ψ(F) if and only if F is bounded. Then there would be a sentence
that fixes the smallest unbounded concept, the Lo¨wenheim number for the pure
second-order language. But if there were a concept that large, then it, too, would
be bounded, which is impossible.
This is only to be expected. We began with the inchoate thought, shared by
many set theorists, that the universe is ineffable, and we took that to be some-
thing like “not characterized by logical resources alone”. And “logical resources”
was glossed as something like “bounded by a sentence of pure second-order logic”.
So we cannot expect to be able to describe the universe using those same logical
resources. One cannot describe the indescribable.
To be sure, our notion of “bounded” is definable in ordinary set theory. That is why
we were able to characterize models of the theory in the previous section, within
ZFC. But the neo-logicist is out to found or reconstruct set theory, and so cannot
simply use it.
One option is to ascend to a third-order language. Let E be a variable ranging over
concepts of concepts. There is a formula DEF(E) of “pure” third-order logic that
is satisfied by E if and only if E(X) is satisfied by a concept F if and only if there
is a sentence of pure second-order logic such that ΦF .
It is not difficult, though tedious, to construct DEF by mimicking a Tarskian ex-
plicit definition of truth for the second-order fragment of the language. We have
that a concept F is fixed if and only if :
∃E(DEF(E) & EF & ∀Y(EY → F  Y),
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and F is bounded if and only if
∃X(F  X & ∃E(DEF(E) & EF & ∀Y(EY → F  Y).
Call this last formula Bad2(F), and define Good2(F) as ¬Bad2(F). Now we do have
the resources to say that a concept has an extension if and only if it is bounded:
(F) = (G) ≡ ((Bad2(F) & Bad2(G)) ∨ ∀x(Fx ≡ Gx) (RV3)
This is an abstraction principle. So if our neo-logicist can invoke a third-order
language, he can at least potentially use (RV3) to ground a mathematical theory.
And it is a fairly powerful theory of sets. By comprehension, each instance of (RF)
is a consequence of (RV3). So the results from previous sections carry over, and
some of them can be sharpened. The theory (RV3) entails the principles of empty
extension, singletons, pairs, infinity, doubly-bounded union, and unrestricted re-
placement. As above, the local axiom of choice follows from (AC), and the ax-
iom of foundation holds on the hereditarily well-founded extensions. And there
is more. Since every Good2 concept is bounded, we also have an unrestricted
power-extension principle: if a concept F has an extension, then so does its power-
concept. So (RV3) entails all of the axioms of ZFC, except for union.
However, the omission of (unrestricted) union from the consequences of (RV3)
cannot be easily remedied, say by adding it as another axiom. Indeed, the nega-
tion of even a weak union principle is a logical consequence of (RV3). Extensions
of the results of the previous section show that for each standard model of (RV3),
foundation, and (AC), there is a cardinal κ (or Ω) such that a subset a of the do-
main is Good2 if and only if |a| < lκ, where lκ is the κ-limit (as defined in the
previous section). And recall that the κ-limits all have cofinality ω. So it follows
that in each standard model there is a countable set a = {a1, a2, ...} , such that a
is Good2 (by replacement, because a is countable), each ai is Good2 (because it is
smaller than lκ), but the union of a is Bad2 (because it has size lκ). In other words,
each standard model of (RV3), foundation, and (AC) has a counterexample to even
countable union. Moreover, in each standard model of (RV3) the concept of being
a hereditarily well-founded extension will have confinality ω.
Nevertheless, (RV3) is a powerful theory. Since it entails the axioms of FZBB2
(and FZBB of [32]), it has the resources to reconstruct every extant mathematical
theory short of foundational theories like ZFC and the various category theoretic
foundations. It has a model of Zermelo set theory, and much more. So perhaps it
can be deployed by the neo-logicist, as an awkward but reasonably powerful theory
of sets.
8 The Company you keep
We presume that readers of this volume do not need a detailed overview of the
Bad Company objection to Scottish neo-logicism. In a nutshell, the complaint is
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that abstraction principles cannot be a legitimate way to introduce mathematical
theories, since some abstractions are inconsistent. The most notorious example, of
course, is Frege’s own Basic Law V:
(F) = (G) ≡ ∀x(Fx ≡ Gx)
As Michael Dummett, a prominent critic of the program, concedes, the Bad Com-
pany objection is better seen as a challenge: “Possibly some restriction, distin-
guishing the case of cardinal numbers from that of value-ranges could be framed.”20
One rather obvious requirement is that an acceptable abstraction principle should
be consistent. But this is not sufficient, as there are abstraction principles that are
satisfiable only on finite domains. Such principles conflict with Hume’s principle.
The Scottish neo-logicists have risen to this challenge, and proposed a number of
conservation requirements on acceptable abstractions. Many of these can be for-
mulated, external to the program, in model-theoretic terms. Say that an abstraction
Σ is stable21 if there is some cardinal λ such that for all κ > λ, Σ is satisfiable in a
domain of cardinality κ. This is a rather stringent requirement and perhaps a desir-
able quality for a proposed abstraction principle to enjoy. If Σ is stable, then given
a sufficiently large initial domain, there must be a way to interpret the abstraction
operator on it so that Σ is true. One more reason to think stability is desirable
is the observation that given the axiom of choice, Hume’s principle, which is the
neo-logicist gold standard, is stable.
Crispin Wright once made the following proposal: “Why not just say that pairwise
incompatible but individually conservative abstractions are ruled out . . . and
have done with it” (assuming a precise definition of conservativeness, which is
omitted here).22 This suggests yet another criterion for acceptability. Say that an
abstraction principle Σ is irenic if it is jointly satisfiable with every conservative
abstraction principle. Remarkably, [37] shows that if an abstraction principle is
stable, then it is irenic.23
Thus stability may initially seem an attractive necessary and sufficient condition
for acceptability.24 We must report, however, that the present (RV3) is not stable.
20See [6], p. 375.
21As far as we know, the notion of stability was first formulated by [12], n. 5, who called it a
“promising necessary condition on” abstractions. [7], 511, and [8], 114, seems to be the first to
employ the word “stable” for this criterion.
22See [38], 23.
23See his Theorem 6.1. [37] invokes a slightly stronger notion, defining an abstraction Σ to be
stable “if for some cardinal λ, Σ is true at all and only models of cardinality ≥ λ (emphasis ours).
He shows that if an abstraction is stable in that sense, then it is irenic. Unfortunately, the converse
does not hold for the stronger notion, despite the statement of Weir’s Theorem 6.1. His argument for
this actually invokes the present notion, and the result is correct for it. Weir’s result assumes that the
background language is at least third-order, since it involves replacing an abstraction operator with a
variable and then binding that variable.
24Though see [21] for arguments to the effect that stability alone cannot be sufficient for accept-
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This follows from a more general result. In present terms, say that a theory of sets
satisfies “countable replacement” if it entails that every countable concept is Good.
This is a rather minimal requirement, one that just about any set theory should
satisfy (although Zermelo set theory does not). (RV3) easily satisfies countable re-
placement, since it satisfies unrestricted replacement and infinity. So does FZBB2,
since that theory satisfies bounded replacement and infinity.
[34] shows that no set theory that satisfies countable replacement is stable. In
particular, such a theory is not satisfiable at a cardinal κ if κ has more than κ-many
countable subsets. It is easy to see that there are unboundedly many such cardinals.
Indeed if λ is a limit ordinal with confinality ω (e.g., if λ = κ + ω, for any cardinal
κ), then iλ has more than iλ-many countable subsets. In particular, (RV3) (and
FZBB2) has no model of size iλ.
It seems that a neo-logicist who hopes to capture a decent set theory cannot adopt
stability as a necessary condition on abstraction principles.25
This might not be as serious as it sounds. Set theory is supposed to be a founda-
tional theory, able to provide surrogates for any mathematical objects whatsoever.
It is to describe the realm of models for itself and other theories. So it is no wonder
that there are arbitrarily large sets on which set theory itself fails to be satisfiable.
Perhaps our neo-logicist can accept (RV3) by pleading that a foundational theory
need not be stable. This leaves open a Bad-Company-style objection from the pos-
sibility of an alternative acceptable foundational theory, which fails to be stable but
which is incompatible with (RV3). This would be an analogue of the “distraction
principles” in [37]. But we will not pursue this line any further.
Say that an abstraction principle Σ is unbounded if, for every cardinal λ, there
is a κ > λ such that Σ has a model whose domain has cardinality κ. So if Σ is
unbounded, then (assuming the axiom of choice) we can turn any set into a model
of Σ by adding more elements (presumably to serve as abstracts).
It is reasonable to require that any acceptable abstraction principle—especially a
foundational one—be unbounded. For one reason, an abstraction principle is con-
servative, in one of the relevant senses, if and only if it is unbounded. More telling
perhaps, is the observation that a bounded abstraction principle imposes an upper
bound to the size of the universe. Recall that, according to Scottish neo-logicism,
acceptable abstraction principles are supposed to be the sort of thing that can be
known a priori, as a matter of definitional stipulation. If an acceptable abstraction
were bounded, then it would be possible to know a priori, as a matter of stipu-
lation, that the universe is smaller than a given, fixed cardinal κ. If nothing else,
neo-logicism would be incompatible with the meta-theory in which the notion of
ability.
25[34] does show that second-order Zermelo set theory, with urelements, is stable. Recall that
Zermelo set theory does not satisfy replacement. It does satisfy union, of course. In a sense, (RV3)
is the opposite, since it satisfies replacement but not union.
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boundedness is formulated—the theory in which the existence of κ is formulated
and proved.
The good news is that (RV3) is unbounded. Recall our definition of the Ω-limit,
sometimes called the Lo¨wenheim number for second-order languages: for each
sentence Φ of our pure second-order language, let f (Φ) be the smallest cardinal
δ such that Φδ is true, if there is such a cardinal δ; otherwise, let f (Φ) = 0. The
Ω-limit, lΩ is the union of the set of all f (Φ). So if a sentence Φ is satisfiable at all,
then it is satisfiable on a set smaller than the Ω-limit. Let λ be the Ω-limit, and let
κ be any cardinal. It is easy to check that there is a set d such that |d| > κ, and for
any a ⊆ d, if |a| < λ then a ∈ d. Such a set d is a model of (RV3).
We must report, however, that this bit of good news is not really all that good. Even
though there is no upper limit to cardinality to the domain of models of (RV3), the
theory does fix an absolute upper bound on the size of Good2 concepts, namely the
Lo¨wenheim number λ. There is no model of (RV3) which contains an extension
with λ-many members. This is, admittedly, a rather large bound, at least by any
standards other than those of a jaded set theorist. If there is an inaccessible cardinal,
then λ is larger than the smallest one; if there is a measurable cardinal, then λ is
larger than the smallest one, etc.26
Nevertheless, (RV3) does set an upper bound to the size of Good2 concepts and
thus extensions. And if our set theory is to play its foundational role, it is the
extensions that are to provide surrogates for mathematical objects. So if (RV3) is
an acceptable abstraction principle, and is to play its foundational role, then we
would know, a priori, that there are no more than λ mathematical objects. This is
in obvious tension with ZFC, the very theory in which we establish this bound. We
do not speculate as to how this tension should be resolved.
9 Ineffability again
The real conceptual problem with (RV3) is that it is itself in tension with the thesis
that the universe of extensions is ineffable—the very heuristic hypothesis that moti-
vates our development of FZBB2 (and FZBB of [32]). Since the initial background
language for our theorizing was second-order, we glossed, or explicated, the in-
choate notion of ineffability as something like “not bounded by a sentence of the
pure second-order language”, and we adopted a scheme that makes being bounded
26A property P(x) of sets is said to be “local” if there is a formula Ψ(x) in the language of first-
order set theory, such that for each x, P(x) holds if and only if ∃δ(VδModelsΨ(x)) (where Vδ is
the δth rank). The idea is that local properties are those with a characterization that only refers to
the sets below a fixed rank. One does not need to refer to “arbitrarily large” sets in order to state
whether a given set has the property. Inaccessible, Mahlo, hyper-Mahlo, and measurable are all local
properties. Define a cardinal λ to be “minimal-local” if there is a local property P(x) such that λ is
the smallest cardinal with property P(x). The Ω-limit is the union of all minimal-local cardinals. So,
for example, if there is a measurable cardinal, then the Ω-limit is greater than the smallest one.
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by a sentence of that language a sufficient condition for a concept to be Good. We
obtained some mileage from that, by bootstrapping. But now, with (RV3), we move
to a third-order language and thereby manage to say exactly which concepts are not
bounded by a sentence of the pure second-order language, making that a necessary
and sufficient condition for a concept to have an extension. But if the thought that
the universe is ineffable is correct, as explicated above, then it should also entail
that the universe cannot be bounded by a sentence of the pure third-order language
either. And (RV3) violates that, as it does give a bound to the size of the Good
concepts (and this bound is definable in the third-order language).
Once we move to a third-order language, the hypothesis of ineffability should be
glossed, or explicated, as something like “not bounded by a sentence of the pure
third-order language”, and this would motivate a scheme that makes being bounded
by a sentence of the pure third-order language a sufficient condition for a concept
to be Good. Let (RF3) be the extension the scheme (RF) to include sentences from
the pure third-order language, and let FZBB3 be (RF3) plus (RV). Then the entire
development from §§4 – 6 above can be recapitulated by replacing phrases like
“pure second-order” with “pure third-order”. Even the meta-theory carries over,
almost word for word. The various κ-limits will be higher, of course (since are now
dealing with third-order boundedness), but the results are completely analogous.
Needless to say, with FZBB3 now we are back to having only a sufficient con-
dition for a concept to be Good, and this is not particularly helpful to Scottish
neo-logicism, for the above reasons. The problem is that the third-order language
cannot characterize which concepts are bounded by sentences of that language. We
could remedy that with an explicit definition in a fourth-order language, produc-
ing a single abstraction principle, which we can call (RV4). But once we do that,
the inchoate thought of ineffability suggests that the universe is not bounded by a
sentence that language either.27
It can go on, even into the transfinite. Our standard meta-theory ZFC entails the
consistency of each of the theories FZBB3, FZBB4, . . . , FZBBω, . . . , up to the
limits of what can be expressed in the language of ZFC.
What we have here, it seems, an instance of the phenomenon that started the pro-
cess of reflection in the first place. Recall how [36] 555, put it:
Any time we try to capture the universe from what we positively pos-
sess (or can express) we fail the task and the characterization is satis-
fied by certain (large) sets.
27As stated, (RV4) is incompatible with (RV3). In particular, (RV4) will declare some concepts
to be Good that (RV3) declares to be Bad. That is because the Ω-limit (or Lo¨wenheim number)
for third-order languages is larger than the Ω-limit for second-order languages. In other words, the
two abstraction principles give incompatible necessary and sufficient conditions for a concept to be
Good. This is not a serious problem, since the neo-logicist can just use different -operators in the
different principles. As above, however, it is a serious problem if the neo-logicist wants to declare
both theories to be foundational.
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Every time we add new expressive resources, we can establish the existence of
extensions larger than any we could envision before. But we cannot think that we
have it all. The very act of thinking about what we have—so far—gives us more
than we think.
There is a marked trend in the mathematics of at least the past 150 years of not
tying what exists to what can be constructed, defined, or otherwise characterized
by this or that batch of expressive resources. The acceptance of the law of the law of
excluded middle, non-constructive reasoning generally, impredicative definitions,
the axiom of choice, and, more recently, the almost universal rejection of Go¨del’s
principle of constructibility V = L, are all instances of this trend.28 If any of the
theories in the form (RVn) , or even (RVα) for some definable ordinal α, were taken
to be foundational, it would be a clear violation of this trend. The theory would
declare that all and only extensions are bounded by sentences of the nth-order, or
αth-order, language.
The problem, we submit, applies to any neo-logicist attempt to recapture set theory,
at least if the theory is to be foundational and proceed through a restricted version
of Basic Law V, such as our (RV):
(F) = (G) ≡ ((Bad(F) & Bad(G)) ∨ ∀x(Fx ≡ Gx)) (RV)
Suppose that a neo-logicist comes up with a necessary and sufficient condition for a
concept to be good, using whatever resources are allowed in acceptable abstraction
principles. Call the definition Good . Then the abstraction principle would be:
(F) = (G) ≡ ((¬Good (F) & ¬Good (G)) ∨ ∀x(Fx ≡ Gx)) (1)
Suppose also that our neo-logicist establishes, or just adopts, a general replacement
principle (in line with the limitation of size conception):
∀X∀Y((Good (X) & Good (Y) & Y  X)→ Good (Y))
In words, if a concept is Good , then so is any concept of that size or smaller.
If this is accomplished, then the neo-logicist can give a bound to the universe, in the
sense that she has the resources to specify how large the smallest Bad concept is.
So she cannot adopt the foregoing theme of ineffability, that if a concept is bounded
by whatever resources are in play, then it is Good , nor can she adopt the common
view, articulated by Wang, that underlies reflection principles. If an abstraction
principle, in the above form, is to have the foundational role played by set theory,
then it would be a declaration that we can “capture the universe from what we
positively possess (or can express)”.
28Of course, this is not to say that there is something illegitimate with intuitionistic systems, pred-
icative analyses, or the like. It is only to say that mathematics is not limited to such things.
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